The expiry of AGOA is no cliff edge for African exporters. The deeper challenge lies in the shifting trade winds of Washington’s tariff politics.
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) lapsed at the end of September 2025.
Alarm is understandable — AGOA has been the flagship of US–Africa trade policy for a quarter of a century. But a look at the numbers suggests expiry would be a pinch rather than a punch for the continent as a whole, with sharper pain concentrated in a few countries and sectors.
AGOA began in 2000 and was extended in 2015. Its promise was straightforward — tariff-free access to the US market would spur investment, jobs and exports.
The reality has fallen short. The share of African exports entering the United States under AGOA rose quickly in the 2000s, then slid as American energy imports collapsed.
By last year, only 21.3% of Africa’s exports to the US used AGOA preferences. Total trade under the scheme peaked at $65.8bn in 2008 and was just $8.4bn in 2024.
AGOA is mostly hydrocarbons
Oil is the reason. Hydrocarbons accounted for roughly 44% of AGOA trade in 2023, and 25% last year. The US fracking boom turned America into a net energy exporter, crushing demand for imported crude from Africa.
Diversification into higher-value manufactures has been limited. Consumer-goods exports fell even as intermediate goods rose, a sign that ‘Made in Africa’ finished products still struggle to scale in the US market.
If AGOA expires with no replacement, what changes in practice? Our estimate is that exports currently using AGOA would fall by around 13.6%.
This is equal to 4.2% of total exports from AGOA beneficiaries to the US; 1.7% of Africa’s overall exports to the US; and 0.2% of Africa’s global exports. In a stress case, the drop could be 27.2% of AGOA-covered flows.
Three features keep the aggregate damage modest. First, oil and several metals — copper, zinc, tin, nickel and other non-ferrous materials — would continue to face no or low duties under US schedules, so a large share of what Africa sells today would remain unaffected. Second, AGOA utilisation is low in most countries.
Nearly half of beneficiaries have a utilisation rate of 2% or less, which means most of what they ship to the US already pays tariffs and will see no change from AGOA’s expiry alone. Third, AGOA use is concentrated. In 2023, Nigeria and South Africa alone accounted for 75% of AGOA exports; three sectors — oil and gas, transport equipment and apparel — made up three quarters of the total.
Garment makers take cover
The exposure is therefore specific. Apparel-led exporters such as Kenya and Lesotho would face the sharpest adjustment as garments lose preferences and margins thin.
By contrast Nigeria, the single largest AGOA exporter, would be largely insulated because crude is not in scope for higher duties under current schedules. South Africa’s transport equipment and automotive components would warrant a closer look at tariff lines and rules of origin.
Some will argue that a separate shock — new US import tariffs announced this year — is the real story. That is a different channel. If across-the-board duties rise on non-AGOA trade, Africa’s exports could fall on those lines irrespective of AGOA’s status. The point here is narrower. The expiry of AGOA, on its own, would not amount to a continent-wide trade cliff.
There is evidence that demand can sustain exports even when preferences vanish. Ethiopia continued to ship sizable apparel volumes after losing eligibility in 2021.
Uganda’s exports to the US rose after its removal in December 2023 and have continued to grow in 2025. One should be careful — product mix matters, as do exchange rates and firm-level contracts — but these cases show that preference erosion does not always mean market exit.
What should policy-makers do?
If Washington renews AGOA, the text should add what the original lacked — funded capacity-building tied to export outcomes, clearer and more flexible rules of origin for regional cumulation within the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and a standing mechanism for country-level AGOA strategies that align industrial policy with market access.
If expiry is unavoidable, African governments should treat it as a spur to invest in productivity at home and to make better use of AfCFTA preferences, while pushing for US procurement access and development finance that crowds in investors in manufacturing.
Market access matters, but it is not sufficient. AGOA struggled because investment did not follow preference. The lesson for any successor scheme is simple and unfashionable — investment in productive capacity must accompany preferential access.