The World Bank, founded in the post–World War II era when many current members were still under colonial rule, faces a growing legitimacy crisis. Its governance structure has not kept pace with modern norms of democracy and accountability. Despite multiple shareholding reviews, wealthy nations remain dominant: high-income countries hold over 60% of voting shares, with the United States alone holding more than 15%—enough for de facto veto power.
This imbalance persists even though developing countries now account for the majority of the world’s population and contribute far more to global GDP than in the past. As the Bank’s main borrowers, developing countries bear the direct costs and risks of its lending policies which had severe negative impacts in the past such as the Structural Adjustment Program. Evidence from the Bank’s own Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) shows that projects are more effective when borrowers have strong ownership—yet the Bank’s priorities often diverge from national and regional agendas like the African Union’s Agenda 2063.
Achieving voting parity would transform the Bank from an institution dominated by a small bloc of wealthy states into a truly multipolar development lender. Politically, this shift would mark a significant turning point in post-war global governance, strengthen multilateralism, enhance legitimacy, and foster more equitable North–South relations.
Although Africa’s share of voting power may not rise significantly under parity, the continent would still benefit from the broader empowerment of developing countries, whose collective influence would push the Bank toward policies more aligned with their development priorities.
To address this imbalance, greater representation of developing countries in governance is essential. Three key reforms are proposed:
1.Equal Voting Shares Between Borrowers and Non-Borrowers
Amend the Bank’s Articles of Agreement to split voting shares 50–50 between borrower and non-borrower countries. This could be achieved by high-income countries selling 15 percentage points (23% of their shares) to developing countries, or through a General Capital Increase (GCI) in which developing countries acquire most new shares. Given that paid-in capital is a small fraction of the Bank’s total, costs would be manageable—especially if a GCI without paid-in capital is pursued.
2.Increase Basic Votes to 50%
Basic votes, originally intended to safeguard the influence of smaller and poorer members, have declined from 10.78% of total votes to just 5.5% today. Raising their share to 50%—a 127% increase in number—would decouple economic weight from decision-making power and restore balance between developed and developing members.
3.Introduce Double-Majority Voting
For decisions directly affecting developing countries—such as lending levels, loan conditions, and development policy direction—a double-majority system should be adopted. This would require both a majority among the Board of Governors or Executive Directors and a majority of the Bank’s full membership, ensuring borrower perspectives are central to decision-making.
As the World Bank undertakes its Fourth Shareholding Review in 2025, these reforms represent an opportunity for the institution to modernize, reflect global economic realities, and fulfill its mandate more effectively. Increasing developing countries’ voice and power would not only enhance the relevance of Bank policies but also ensure they are shaped by those most affected.
