DEVELOPMENT REIMAGINED

US-Africa Leaders' Summit: Policy Brief

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US-AFRICA LEADERS' SUMMIT: POLICY BRIEF

This policy brief is intended to support African leaders, governments, policymakers, and thought-leaders, as well as development practitioners, in delivering clear positions on US-Africa engagement meeting to meet Africa's long-term development needs, with a view to shifting the relationship to be focused on "Africa-US" engagement. In this respect, it proposes process-based and substantive steps required to increase African agency and coordination in the plurilateral relationship, and overall focus on ensuring the US both does not harm and actively contributes to the continent's progress towards the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the African Union's Agenda 2063.

PART 1:

1 HOW TO SHIFT THE US-AFRICA PROCESS TO AN AFRICA-US PROCESS?

This part of the briefing focuses on process-based challenges facing US and African engagement and provides strategic recommendations which US and African leaders can implement both within the Summit itself, and beyond, to better meet African needs and incorporate African agency.

There are **four key challenges** that the US-Africa Process currently faces, identified by Africans independently as well as through comparison with African experiences of other "Africa-Plus-One" Summits which have emerged over the past few decades. These include Summits such as the Africa-France Summit, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the UK-Africa Investment Summit, and the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). Although each has their own merits and challenges, there is an opportunity for the US to learn from others who have hosted numerous Summits and Forums in the past to enhance engagement with African partners for mutual benefit.

1.1 Challenge 1: A lack of consistent, clear timelines and deliverables

In comparison to other Africa+1 summits, the US-Africa process is irregular, and has few timelines and specific deliverables. Take FOCAC as an example - it has a regular China-Africa Summit held every three years and has earned a high reputation based on its persistence and practicality of implementable commitments. For instance, the Dakar Action Plan came out in the 8^{th} FOCAC in 2021, and contained detailed, clear deliverables. For example, this includes \$40 billion in financial commitments, 10 connectivity projects for Africa, numerous initiatives, and figures for how many Chinese experts will visit Africa to offer support in specific fields within three years (e.g., 500 agricultural experts will offer field support in African countries). The 2018 Action Plan has clear links with the AU Agenda 2063 Continental Frameworks. Such a detailed plan, drafted and approved by both parties during FOCAC, makes the meeting more reliable, and legitimate.

1.2 Challenge 2: A fragmented approach by the US

The fragmentation in the US's engagement with Africa has long been seen as a barrier towards effective engagement with the continent. US engagement with the continent is often broken into a wide variety of smaller initiatives, programs and partnerships managed by various departments and bureaus, but lacks a comprehensive framework to track ongoing progress and deliverables. For example, funding is dispersed through 25 executive departments or independent agencies involved in US foreign assistance, highlighting the bureaucratic complexities and intensive interagency work.

One example of this can be seen in action on climate change, which has become a flagship in Biden's Africa policy, with the strategic objective to support energy transition and climate adaptation. However, there are many programs carried by different agencies, some of which have overlapping areas of remit. These include:

- Power Africa,
- Electrify Africa,
- Energy Resource Governance Initiative,
- Climate Finance Plus,
- Clean Energy Demand Initiative,
- Energy Transition Accelerator, President's Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE),
- And multilateral initiatives, including but not limited to, Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (under G7), Just Energy Transition Partnership (on South Africa), Global Methane Pledge (launched with the EU).

Such institutional fragmentation creates collective action difficulties and limits the capacities of individual programs given the relatively thin spread of funding. Further, African partners must coordinate with several separate US agencies, rather than a more streamlined and integrated counterpart, causing overlapping efforts that may impede their own bureaucratic capacities.

1.3 Challenge 3: Lack of recognition of African perspectives and priorities

The U.S.-Africa relationship is often seen as paternalistic, whereas other Summits such as FOCAC has offered space for a partnership between Africa and China. For instance, H.E. Wu Peng, the Director-General of the Department of African Affairs, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a PIDA dialogue, "*China has confidence in Africa's development and treats Africa as an equal economic partner, not as a place of charity".*

This perception is strengthened by American insistence on framing its engagement with Africa dividing the continent into two - "Sub-Saharan Africa" and "North Africa"; whilst concurrently placing different North African countries into an overarching category of "Middle East and North Africa". As emphasized by experts such as Dr Zainab Usman, the implementations of policy directives have often been divided along this oversimplified classification by the US, disregarding both the similarities and heterogeneities in governance capacities, economic structures, social demands and development opportunities across the continent, and overall reinforces problematic divisions which many African Leaders and policymakers have rejected, from the founding of the OAU all the way back in 1963 (now AU, since 2002), re-emphasized through the establishment of Agenda 2063 in 2014, and more recently through the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

This kind of fragmentation and lack of engagement with African-designed and owned plans and frameworks reinforces a view that the U.S.-Africa relationship is paternalistic and driven by US bilateral concerns rather than real development concerns.

1.4 Challenge 4: Lack of preparation and transparency

There is a perception that US initiatives are often ad hoc and not credible. For example, after the Blue Dot Network (2019), the Biden Administration launched new global infrastructural strategies with its G7 allies including the Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership in 2021, and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure (PGII) in 2022 which plans to mobilize $200 billion over the next five years.

However, despite big numbers, when compared to other initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the US plans have not been demonstrably backed up with action, or clear explanations. In China-Africa relations, the BRI has become closely connected with the FOCAC, with 52 African nations and the African Union having signed the BRI with China so far. Further, coordination has been extended beyond the initial FOCAC meetings. For example, following the 8th FOCAC, there have been regular Program Infrastructure Development for Africa (PIDA) dialogues, organised by the AU Permanent Mission to China and Development Reimagined, bring together Chinese stakeholders and African Ambassadors to China and African institutions to ensure commitments to regional infrastructure are delivered in a transparent and timely manner.

These four identified challenges suggest the following four recommendations:

1.4.1 Recommendation 1

Aim to include as many concrete figures as possible in the Summit

The FOCAC involve both the Chinese and African sides working together ahead of the Meeting. This includes discussing concrete figures and programmes which can be attained in the three-year period between Summits, which also enable engagement to be tracked and monitored accordingly. Compared with the regular FOCAC, as well as Summits such as TICAD, which also includes clear figures, the 2014 U.S.-Africa Leader Summit was questioned for its lack of financial commitments and vague statements, which reduces its creditability. Going forward, the Summit should therefore include clear financial commitments and programme objectives - instead of overarching initiatives which lack detail.

1.4.2 RECOMMENDATION 2

Use African initiatives, frameworks and institutions as benchmarks and reference points

The U.S.-Africa Summit this year can be used as a platform for the U.S. to show their respect and partnership-oriented value toward African states, for example by ensuring significant framing references to the AfCFTA and as many as possible of the other frameworks and flagship projects of Agenda 2063 and committing to reform US institutions to avoid use of categories that are not designed by African countries. This will lead to a process that can avoid different agencies pursuing conflicting goals or wasting resources on duplicative works that mismatch African interests, carving out a more streamlined Africa strategy could start with finding areas of alignment with Africa-owned regional priorities and development prospects. The summit could also commit to more consistent and regular institutional-level engagement with the AU, AU-NEPAD, AfCFTA and African financial institutions such as the AfDB and AfrExim Bank, as well as Africa's 8 Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

1.4.3 RECOMMENDATION 3

Form inter-agency working groups on key topics

These should be formed with multiple African countries on an issue-based manner to increase coordination, as well as to increase accountability and monitoring of Summit and initiative deliverables. This should be in conjunction with African teams across the continent. For example - a continent-wide lens on trade that corresponds to US commitment to support the AfCFTA is crucial and can also be extended to a sub-regional lens whilst looking at different AU frameworks, such as connectivity infrastructure or climate adaptation. This will also contribute to reducing the "sub-Saharan African" vs "North Africa" binary.

1.4.4 RECOMMENDATION 4

Agree to the next Summit and a Comprehensive Post-Summit Strategy

The desirable outcome from the Summit is not announcing another initiative (either new or revamped). Instead, the US and African side must work together to plan and announce the next summit – to increase predictability in the relationship, as well as create a comprehensive blueprint or joint strategy that maps out the interlinks among the wide variety of programs for the prioritized issues raised during the Summit. This should include clear timelines and deliverables to increase the credibility of Summit commitments and reduce fragmentation and overlap. The follow-up process should be led by African Ambassadors to the US amongst themselves, with key U.S. stakeholders brought in as needed, to accelerate action. Such an African Ambassador-led process has been tried and tested in China and can easily be applied in the US setting.

PART 2:

2 SUBSTANTIVE AREAS FOR AGREEMENT – WHAT SHOULD BE ON THE TABLE FOR AFRICANS?

Alongside process-based challenges the Summit faces, there are several areas which are essential to cooperation between the US and African countries going forward.

U.S. priorities in Africa have traditionally centered on economic development, regional security, and human rights concerns. These issues remain relevant even as the pandemic, and pandemic-related food security and debt issues, have become key themes. In August 2022, the White House released a 4-point strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa: creating open societies, pandemic recovery, climate action, and regional security.

But what are African priorities, and how do they align with US priorities? What is the “sweet spot” for cooperation?

This part of the briefing examines the Africa-US relationship to date and provides practical recommendations for policymakers and experts of the following seven areas: **trade, health, people-to-people flows, strategic minerals, geopolitics and climate action**, with a view to ensuring that African interests and priorities are driving the engagement with the US at the Summit, rather than just the other way around.

2.1 Area 1: From US-Africa to Africa-US Trade Engagement

The US employs a number of instruments and techniques as it engages with Africa on trade, including the Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA), free trade agreements and doing business reforms.

2.1.1 BACKGROUND POLICY PROGRESS TO DATE

AGOA is a flagship and unique preferential trade scheme, first enacted in 2000, that allows for the duty-free treatment to goods from certain Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA). The US Congress enacted pursuant to a request by US to waive its obligations under Article I (1) Article XIII (1) and (2) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994), and it is meant to run through 30 September 2025. There have been two notable benefits of AGOA to eligible states. First, in terms of increasing trade volume, analysis shows that U.S. imports from AGOA-eligible countries (including those eligible under the Generalized System of Preferences Program) stood at $8.4 billion in 2019, an increase of 2.4 percent from 2001, the first calendar year AGOA was in effect. Reports suggest that more than 5,000 products are eligible for duty-free access. Second, it has been seen as having created growth by stimulating the private sector and creating jobs.

Despite these significant benefits, it is estimated that most of the tariff lines have not be utilized - under 20% across the continent due to market access challenges- such as stringent Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS). The scheme is also unilateral. It can be withdrawn by the US at from the scheme when it announced that it would ban importation of second-hand clothes in 2018. Guinea, Mali and Ethiopia were recently suspended on what the US determines a human rights situation.

Moreover, AGOA only benefits African countries referred to as '*AGOA eligible states*' - completely excluding North African states, which is inconsistent with African-led initiatives such as the AfCFTA which promotes intra-African trade integration. Further, data also show that all countries who trade under AGOA nevertheless maintain trade deficit in their trade with the US (Figure 1). Overall, Africa makes a very small proportion of US imports (under 2%) and the US has declined in absolute and relative terms with respect to African trade.



Figure 1: Aggregate two-way goods trade between AGOA Countries and the US.

The US only has one current Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with an African country. FTA negotiations between South Africa and the US failed but the US FTA with Morocco was signed in 2004, and came into force in 2006. It covers several trade areas (Box 1). Under the Trump Administration the US tried to negotiate an FTA with Kenya which was then supposed to become a model for future trade agreements with other African countries.

Box 1: Key elements of USA-Morocco FTA

- Agriculture And Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
- Agriculture Safeguard Measures
- Textiles And Apparel
- Rules Of Origin
- Customs Administration
- Technical Barriers to Trade
- Government Procurement

The US has also shown interest in Deep Trade Agreements (DTAs). DTAs cover trade as well as international flows of investment and labour and the protection of intellectual property rights and the environment.[1] None have been agreed with an African country yet. However, the current US leadership has emphasized the importance of incorporating climate action in discussions on trade policy. This approach includes reviewing the FTAs that Kenya concluded with the Trump Administration, which now have moved toward negotiating what is being referred to as 'the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership'.

These trends points to two key issues. First, the US maintaining arrangements that do not fully create agency for African countries - such as the unilateralism embedded in AGOA. Second, since FTAs are reciprocal, they do not consider the African countries unique economic and development situations and proceed from the premise that African countries have the capacity to implement the mechanisms under them to address aspects like rules of origin and SPS measures**.**

There is also a need for the US- Africa relations to better support cross-African trade policy shifts and ambitions. In particular, the AfCFTA has an inclusive private sector strategy focused on four initial priority sectors or value chains, namely; agro-processing, automotive, pharmaceuticals, and transportation and logistics, based on the potential for import substitution and existing production capabilities on the continent.[2] For instance, research indicates that developing the automotive industry means attracting investment in assembly. The AfCFTA potentially offers an expanded regional market to attract such investment.[3] The centre of the industry lies in the component sector. In turn this requires large scale assembly plants- which needs huge FDI flows. The USA can play a role in this especially regarding environmentally friendly automotive products like electric vehicles.

[1] Hofmann Claudia, Alberto Osnago and Michele Ruta, (2017). "Horizontal Depth: A New Database on the Content of Preferential Trade Agreements". Policy Research working paper; no. WPS 7981. Washington, D.C: World Bank Group.
[2] https://au-afcfta.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/SG-Speaking-Notes-Africa-Investment-Partnership-Forum.pdf
[3] https://odi.org/documents/8264/VVC_paper_final___.pdf

2.1.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

At and beyond the US-Africa Summit, three recommendations could accelerate the growth of U.S. and Africa trade cooperation.

- **Commit to review AGOA and all FTA/DTAs under discussion considering AfCFTA and Agenda 2063**

African countries need to ensure AGOA is in line with AfCFTA (e.g. coverage of the entire continent not just a few LDCs), as well as the Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT) framework, the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), the Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA), and the African Mining Vision (AMV). This will take preparation and analysis, but openness can be indicated through the summit.

- **Commit to prioritizing new sectors for bilateral trade and investment beyond textiles**

For instance, UNCTAD estimates that the automotive industry has the largest untapped export potential of $1.4 billion, followed by sugar ($1.3 billion) and fish and crustaceans ($1.1 billion) processing.

- **Shift away from a focus on "doing business reforms" to creating trade facilitative environments in the US**

For instance, the US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa does not prioritize market access for Africa's products. This shift needs to include investments that can lead to capacity building and enhance competitiveness of Africa products beyond the apparel exported under AGOA.

2.2 Area 2: From US-Africa to Africa-US Financial Engagement

The US employs several instruments and techniques as it engages with Africa financially, including Overseas Development Aid (ODA), bilateral and multilateral lending instruments, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

2.2.1 BACKGROUND POLICY PROGRESS TO DATE

As a share of African debt, U.S. bilateral loans have been declining rapidly since 1989, falling by 50 percent since 2014 from 2 percent to 0.9% in 2020, whilst other development partners, such as China account for a significantly higher proportion.



Figure 2: African external debt by lender (1970-2020).

U.S. ODA and FDI is also lagging behind other sources in the context of Africa's continental priorities for development finance. The AfDB notes that the continent's infrastructure needs amount to $130–170 billion a year, with a financing gap in the range $68–$108 billion. Yet, since 2003, Chinese stakeholders have increasingly financed projects in telecommunications, transport logistics, and other key infrastructural needs, while US development aid has targeted some sectors such as electrification and education, with for example, the U.S. Power Africa initiative. The World Bank – which the US is a significant shareholder - has not invested in infrastructure on the continent sufficiently. For instance, the Bank has not financed a new rail project in Africa since 2002.

Since 2014 the share of U.S. outbound FDI to Africa has also been declining. As shown below, by 2021 the US direct investment position had fallen 67 percent to $44.8 billion from a 2014 peak of $67.6 billion.



Figure 3: US Direct Investment Position in Africa 2011-2021, in billions USD.

In terms of quality, US FDI too has largely stuck to decades-long trends of investment in mining and financial sectors. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) was launched in 2020 to help spur investment in specific sectors identified as critical, including in Africa. For example, the “open societies” priority includes a call for African countries to “more transparently leverage their natural resources for sustainable development”, while “climate action” also calls for investment in critical minerals and renewable energy, and “pandemic recovery” involves U.S. investments in pharmaceutical manufacturing and food systems. However, for example, US venture capital firms have been investing significantly in African FinTech over the past few years, but this has not translated into broader investments which align with wider continental plans and frameworks under Agenda 2063. Part of this is due to misleading risk perceptions, driven by Credit Rating Agencies.

To achieve their priorities, the U.S. and African countries must address two key issues. First, U.S. FDI and development aid are too low to address both U.S. and African priorities – particularly in the physical and digital infrastructure needed to advance electrification, manufacturing, and the information technology sector.

Second, the U.S. has not aligned its strategy closely enough with Africa’s continental institutions and development priorities under Agenda 2063, losing ground to China and other development partners who offer opportunities directly aligned with African priorities.

2.2.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

At and beyond the US-Africa Summit, three recommendations could accelerate the growth of U.S. and Africa financial cooperation.

- **Commit to supporting – including with new grant and concessional finance – African-led initiatives and institutions**

This will enable more and better-aligned ODA and FDI from the US, localizing institutions such as DFC and USAID. Mechanisms for investment could include committing finance to the AfDB, AfriEximBank, various regional development banks, or for instance the newly-launched Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa (AGIA), an initiative seeking to scale and accelerate $10 billion in private investment in climate-related infrastructure projects. U.S. DFC and trade envoys could formalize financial and strategic cooperation with these organizations or initiatives.

- **Commit to using the US stakeholder voice to push MDBs (esp. WB and IMF) to support and finance Africa's continental infrastructure priorities**

The US can push these MDBs to engage more proactively with the Programme for Infrastructural Development in Africa (PIDA) through AU-NEPAD, and deliver creative financing solutions e.g. through provision of concessional loans for regional infrastructure, delivering on the WB capital adequacy framework, borrowers clubs, etc.

- **In expanding FDI, the U.S. should push investors to see African continent as less risky, focus on leveraging American comparative advantages to deliver on African priorities, and minimizing investment in extractive business models**

This can lead to a scaling up of engagement in African vaccine manufacturing, digital transformation and infrastructure, and educational partnerships.

2.3 Area 3: From US-Africa to Africa-US Health Cooperation

The US employs a number of instruments and techniques as it engages with Africa on health, including PEPFAR and other UN and global initiatives, as well as support to the Africa CDC.

2.3.1 BACKGROUND POLICY PROGRESS TO DATE

The US has been working with African countries for decades to combat diseases in the continent. According to a 2022 speech by Secretary of State Anthony J. Blinken, the US has invested over US$100 billion to sub-Saharan Africa to fight diseases in Africa. The continent and the US have collaborated on combating a range of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, infectious diseases and the prevention of child and maternal mortality. For instance, PEPFAR and the Determined, Resilient, Empowered, AIDS-free, Mentored and Safe (DREAMS) partnership - a public-private partnership with a local African organisation to reduce HIV/AIDS infection rates among adolescent girls in 16 African countries reached more than 2 million girls between 10 and 24 years.

More recently, the US donated 166 million COVID-19 vaccines to 48 African countries in 2022. The US has also provided medical assistance, for example through donating ventilators to South Africa worth US$14 million and accompanying equipment and service plans worth US$20 million. Other examples of cooperation including sending infectious disease experts to trained Ethiopian health practitioners on COVID-19 cases. USAID also worked with the government, television and radio stations in Guinea to combat misinformation about the virus. And Power Africa has redirected US$ 7.2 million in the recovery and response to the COVID-19 while having invested grants worth US$ 4.1 million in off-grid solar energy companies for rural and per-urban health facility electrification.

The US also began working with the Africa CDC (which was elevated to an autonomous health agency of the AU in February of 2022) in 2015 to combat Ebola. The US and the Africa CDC signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) in early 2022 to strengthen public health in Africa.

Current US – Africa health partnerships cover a range of areas such as:

- ***National Public Health Institutes:*** The National Public Health Institutes (NPHIs) are key to public health activities, alongside monitoring public health and disease outbreaks in the continent.
- ***Public Health Workforce:*** The US and the Africa CDC have worked towards strengthening the public health workforce on the continent through expanding the Field Epistemology Training Programme, supporting global human resources for health, and working towards capacity building by partnering with the Institute for Workforce Development.
- ***Advanced Molecular Detection:*** The Africa CDC, the US, and others have partnered to launch a Pathogen Genomics Initiative to: (a) strengthen laboratory systems, and (b) enhance disease surveillance in the continent. To fulfil this partnership – institutions were equipped with data infrastructure, data and training.

Importantly, in 2022 the US updated its foreign policy to Africa and it now includes building capacity for health systems to include manufacturing of vaccines and to be responsive to Africa's needs in matters health.

Despite all this financial and medical support, the US was criticized during the COVID-19 pandemic for its hoarding and lack of vaccine provision, opposition to intellectual property waivers for emergencies, and lack of manufacturing capacity on the African continent. However, there are signs of a shift. Moderna and the Government of Kenya signed a Memorandum of Understanding in early 2022 for vaccine and therapeutics manufacturing.

2.3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

At and beyond the US-Africa Summit, three recommendations could accelerate the growth of U.S. and Africa health cooperation:

- **Support the Africa CDC in strengthening its public systems and capacity by assisting in the integration of health data systems in the continent**

This will force close monitoring of developments on the continent, networking, and faster solutions to any emerging infectious disease.

- **Support IP waivers in pandemics/emergencies, plus an investment target for local pharmaceutical production**

While the partnerships are welcome, the US should encourage investment in African countries in the pharmaceutical sector – including both public and private sectors.

- **Create incentives for financing to shift to local organizations**

The US can use its powerful position on boards of GFATM, PEPFAR, etc. to create local procurement targets which will provide stronger incentives for local manufacturing investment. Similarly, ODA deployed by USAID and others should not only work with US-owned companies but should also work with local companies who have more relevant and sustainable solutions as they are on the ground.

2.4 Area 4: From US-Africa to Africa-US People-to-People Flows

While US soft power in African countries is undeniable, the US has a challenging track record when it comes to actually facilitating flows of people two and from the continent.

2.4.1 BACKGROUND POLICY PROGRESS TO DATE

US consulates and embassies across the world have been undergoing massive backlog of visa files, in part due to the prolonged closures during the pandemic. Applicants for US business and tourist visas are waiting a staggering 247 days on average, compared with just 17 days pre-COVID.

Students: International students made up the significant proportion of the global talent circulation. The waiting time for US student via interviews is now at a worldwide average of 49 days as of July. This is five times more compared to the pre-pandemic level and has heavily impacted the plan for prospective students. However, the waiting time across Africa can be significantly higher. In August 2022, Kenyan students reported to be waiting for more than a year to proceed with their application and the dates for visitor visa appointments were not available until June 2024.

Visitor Visas: Short-term visitor visa processing time is much longer than that of students and worker visas, reducing prospective tourism and business travel. This will severely disrupt the people-to-people exchanges between the US and Africa which is important to enhancing socio-economic ties.

Table 1: Visa Appointment Wait Time in selected African cities as of 2022.

City	Visitor (B1/B2)	Student/Exchange Visitors (F, M, J)	Temporary Worker (H, L, O, P, Q)
Nairobi	76	65	49
Addis Ababa	184	17	184
Accra	113	248	30
Lagos	649	31	28
Dar Es Salaam	77	65	65

Tourism Flows: Africa has tremendous tourism potential, but only attracts a very small proportion of the world's tourists. Since COVID-19, tourists have become scarce. While the continent as a whole only attracts just 4% of the world's total – several countries are dependent on tourism, such as Morocco, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tunisia and Tanzania. Overall, 24 million people on the continent rely on tourism for their jobs, with the impacts of COVID-19 severely impacting economies. For example, in Seychelles, tourism revenues declined by 61% in 2020, and as a result the country's 2021 budget has had to be slashed by 10%.

New airline routes, such as Delta's Atlanta and Cape Town - via Johannesburg – route, will boost tourism, with another new direct route between Washington and Cape Town due to be launched in November. With these new routes, the US will continue to be South Africa's top overseas tourism market, after overtaking the UK in 2020 following a 14% increase of US arrivals. Further, US tourists are increasingly looking to travel internationally as COVID-19 restrictions ease. In September 2022, it was reported that 32% of US travelers stated travel was a high budget priority for the next three months. Nevertheless, overall US tourism to the continent requires a must needed boost.

2.4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

At and beyond the US-Africa Summit, three recommendations could accelerate the growth of U.S. and Africa people-to-people cooperation.

- **Prioritize African student visas to the US in Embassies and Consulates**

In the current policy, new students can only be issued up to 120 days in advance of the course start day, which means that the US embassies and consulates are expected to face a surge in student visa applications during the summer. To avoid delaying their plans, the missions in Africa may offer additional appointment time slots for student applicants during summer months. Also, for those first-time applicants should be given an opportunity to correct possible mistakes or unintentional omissions before denying their applications or making applicants restart the visa process.

- **Create fast-track visa programs for key business executives of African enterprises and start-ups**

The business professionals who travel between the US and Africa for attending events, investigating new markets, meeting clients, seeking funding sources, connecting with business networks outside their geographic sphere etc. play crucial role to enhance the US-Africa commercial ties and to empower African growth. A fast-track program could be open to the executives from qualified companies to speed up visa processing in order to explore business opportunities.

- **Support tourism campaigns and work with the AU to enhance the continental Tourism Strategy framework**

Africa, as well as many countries across the world, have rolled out campaigns to spotlight their wildlife, landscape, culture and adventure, such as the "Real Deal Kenya" (Kenya) and "US Never ending Tourists" (the Cape, South Africa). Well-timed with the easing of travel restrictions internationally, the US authorities should assist the African countries in crafting campaign programs aligned with the AU's Tourism Strategy framework to match the interests of domestic audiences, and connect the US private sector partners with Africa to enable the image rebranding and digital marketing.

2.5 Area 5: From US-Africa to Africa-US Critical and Strategic Minerals Engagement

US engagement with Africa on Critical and Strategic Minerals has been highly US-interest driven, framed as countering others, and sometimes to the detriment of African interests.

2.5.1 BACKGROUND POLICY PROGRESS TO DATE

The ongoing energy transition and the development of new technologies for the 4th industrial revolution has increased global appetite for certain minerals and metals. For instance, an electric vehicle requires six times the mineral inputs of a combustion engine car. Meanwhile, minerals such as cobalt and lithium, nickel, and rare earths are currently essential for building wind turbines, photovoltaic solar plants, battery storage, and other components of new energy infrastructure. This has led to a competition among the world's largest economies (especially the U.S. and China) to secure predictable supply of these minerals and metals for their industries, and both countries are looking to Africa. However, leveraging natural resource for development has been a longstanding challenge for Africa countries. It is based on this fact that the African Union (AU) crafted the African Mining Vision (AMV) as a policy instrument intended to facilitate the effective and sustainable use of African resources, geared especially towards socioeconomic and political development.

However, there have been several challenges in the US engagement in the continent's strategic minerals. Recent Executive Orders, diplomatic efforts, and the ramping up of investments all speak to Washington's securitization of the supply of strategic and critical minerals. Statements by U.S. officials strongly suggest that African countries are an integral part of the U.S' strategy to secure supply of these minerals and metals. In his keynote address at the 2022 Investing in Africa Mining Indaba Conference, U.S. Under Secretary Jose W. Fernandez stated that "To be successful, a clean energy partnership between the U.S. and Africa must include promoting refining [of commodities], processing, and other domestic industries that will bring good paying jobs." But so far, investing in refining and processing mineral and metals in African countries seems like an afterthought. That translates to a divergence of priorities between the U.S. and African countries keen to move up the value chain.

China investments in Africa mining sector over the years is a key part of the dominant role it enjoys in the global supply chains of critical minerals and metals: this of course is counted as a strategic vulnerability by the U.S. The US government effort to secure supply of so-called rare-earth elements is also motivated by a recognition of its dependence on China for the supply of rare-earth elements. The statements made by African and U.S. officials at the 2022 Investing in Africa Mining Indaba Conference reveals both the U.S. and African side see enormous opportunity in cooperation. As both rivals are looking to Africa, the chances of their rivalry playing out in the mining sector are expected to grow. Under the Prosper Africa initiative and Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment, the US government intends to invest in infrastructure. However, it is necessary to consider U.S. reluctance to invest in infrastructure (e.g., a road linking a mine to a port) projects where it sees a secondary benefit for China, even though the primary benefit is for the African country.

2.5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

At and beyond the US-Africa Summit, two recommendations could accelerate the growth of U.S. and Africa Critical and Strategic Minerals cooperation.

- **Articulate and implement a plan to localize refining and processing of strategic and critical minerals in African countries, as part of shifting US FDI to support African value-chain ambitions**

The US's need for dependable supply of critical minerals for its security ought to be aligned with African policy goals, and there is an opportunity for the US to be a leader in this respect. Achieving this alignment requires both political will and effective management. There is also an opportunity for the US and African countries to set new norms for resource exploitation to the benefit of African economies, labor laws and the environment, but only if this is matched with real FDI from the US.

- **Commit to a collaborative rather than a combative attitude towards investment in African mining sector**

For African countries to maximize the benefits of global demand for minerals and metals, they must not only create a conducive environment for investment but a collaborative approach of investors. Development of the sector as well as logistical and other related infrastructure cannot be hindered by U.S.-China competition.



2.6 Area 6: From US-Africa to Africa-US Africa's Multilateral and Security Policy

US engagement with Africa on Multilateral and Security has been fairly narrowly framed as countering others, and there is low support for "African solutions to African problems".

2.6.1 BACKGROUND POLICY PROGRESS TO DATE

The continent is facing immense security challenges: the battle against ISWA, Boko Haram and other Islamist militant groups rages on in West Africa, while the resurgence of the M23 rebels in the DRC-Uganda-Rwanda tri-border area has brought real security challenges for regional countries.

Similarly, the Ukraine-Russia conflict has added more complexity to the international security environment. And Africa's response has been the subject of much debate. The April 2022 UN General Assembly resolution was one indicator on policy alignment between African governments and the US government. 17 out of 54 countries abstained from the vote, Eritrea voted against the resolution, and 8 countries were absent. Reporting published by the *Conversation* suggested that the African countries that voted in favor of the resolution were mostly Euro-American aligned democracies like Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana and it was also suggested that the countries all have close military ties with European governments through cooperation in training and joint operations. On the other hand, the countries that abstained or rejected the vote are stated as having military and ideological ties with Russia dating back through the Cold War, countries such as Congo, Algeria, and Mali are included while there are exceptions like Namibia and Senegal.

Another important issue is much needed reforms in global security governance. African leaders like Macky Sall of Senegal and Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia have drawn attention to the need for solutions rooted in multilateralism and mutual benefit. There have also been calls to adjust the conditions for joining the United Nations Security Council, a position supported by most countries of the so-called 'global south'. Africa, through the Ezulwini Consensus, has made her stand clear to the world on the need to reform and restructure the UNSC. The 77th UN General Assembly (UNGA) saw the US leader Joe Biden call for measures to enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the UNSC, the president also expressed that the United States government supports the expansion of the security council in terms of permanent and non-permanent members, calling for permanent seats 'for countries in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean'. He is quoted as saying that 'time has come for this institution to become more inclusive so it can better respond to the needs of today's world'.

Two notable challenges remain:

Several UN peacekeeping crises across Africa. With over 50,000 troops committed to six peacekeeping operations across the continent, UN peacekeepers are the core of multilateral peace operations in Africa. Yet, three (MINUSMA, MONUSCO, MINUSCA) of the six UN peace operations are currently facing a "crisis of consent and legitimacy." Although the three operations are in very challenging contexts, frustration with their lack of effectiveness has necessitated regional countries to form multinational joint taskforces. However, their operationalization is hindered by financial constraints. In a recent interview, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, H.E Moussa F. Mahamat, expressed the UN's reluctance to finance African peace operation, stating "we have been asking for more than ten years for the UN to African operations, but we have not been successful African-led initiatives is key to supporting regional capacity building.

Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act H.R.7311 – Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act is one of legislative tools with which the US seeks to 'monitor and report on Russian political influence and disinformation operations and the activities of Russian, Russia-connected, or Russian-funded private military contractors in Africa' as well as 'strengthen democratic institutions, improve government transparency and accountability, improve standards related to human rights, labor, anti-corruption initiatives, fiscal transparency, monitor natural resources and extractive industries, and other tenets of good governance'. This Act has raised suspicion of impending sanctions targeting African countries with ties to Russia. South African President H.E Ramaphosa has cautioned against the negative effects the bill could have on the continent. He posited that the law could have unintended consequences of punishing efforts to advance development in Africa.

2.6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

At and beyond the US-Africa Summit, three recommendations could accelerate the growth of U.S. and Africa Multilateralism and Security Policy cooperation.

- **US contribution to the African Union Peace Fund (AUPF)**

Since 2018, there has been a push to revitalize the AUPF to ensure the AU can autonomously finance operational activities such as Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy and Peace Support Operations. H.E Moussa F. Mahamat has recently stated "The AU Peace Fund currently has $250m and we still hope to reach $400m soon to improve our prevention capacity".

- **Acknowledgement of African preferences for diplomatic solutions vis-à-vis geopolitical challenges**

The support for diplomatic solutions regarding US-China and the Russia-Ukraine war is prudent for several reasons: African interests are diverse and require cooperation with a wide range of countries, and a deterioration into a full-blown cold war could see proxy wars emerge in Africa.

- **A special U.S.-Africa dialogue with a joint communique on UNSC reform**

While the U.S. acknowledgement of the need to reform the UNSC is welcomed, it is by no means a commitment to the process. Neither is it an end of the common African position of an appropriate representation for the continent. A joint dialogue would enable a coordinated and strategic discussion to make UNSC reform a reality.

2.7 Area 7: From US-Africa to Africa-US Climate Engagement

US climate policy has been accused of hypocrisy, while US climate finance – from grants to loans to FDI - is directed to multiple attractive initiatives but is fairly limited in scale and behind other G7 countries.

2.7.1 BACKGROUND POLICY PROGRESS TO DATE

The new US strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa highlights cooperation on climate action as one of the four major objectives of US strategy on the continent. This climate action cooperation is focused on conservation, climate adaptation, and a just energy transition. Engagement with the African continent takes place through various platforms and initiatives such as Power Africa, USAID's Global Climate Ambition Initiative, and the President's Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE).

For instance, the US is one of the partners in the G7 Just Energy Transition Partnership (JET-P) with South Africa, and has committed $1.02 billion to it - $20 million in grants and $1 billion in commercial loans. During COP27 the US, EU and Germany announced $500 million to support Egypt's transition to clean energy, and the US signed a new MoU with the EU 'For a Just and Green Energy Transition and Sustainable Development of the Energy Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa'. The US government also announced a partnership between US renewable energy companies and the Angolan government to supply $2 billion worth of solar deployment in Angola as part of the PGII initiative, and 'Climate Finance +', is a collaboration between USAID and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), that aims to leverage public and private investment into low- and middle-income countries, with a specific focus on Mozambique, Zambia and Indonesia. The US state Department has launched a Youth Leadership Program for approximately 40 youth from the US and African countries to gain a deeper understanding of adaption and renewable energy solutions. The program will take place in the Spring of 2023.

The US, as the third largest emitter of methane in 2021, accounting for 9% of global methane emissions, has been a strong proponent of global methane reduction policies. In Africa, Nigeria was the largest emitter of methane on the continent in 2021, accounting for almost 2% of global emissions, and 27 African countries have signed the 2030 Global Methane Pledge. The US climate envoy John Kerry announced a $5 million grant to support the AfDB's efforts to reduce methane in September 2022.

Similarly, on adaptation, PREPARE's work in Africa includes $150 million includes support for early warning systems, access to risk-based insurance, support to the AU's Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI), mobilising private sector investment, supporting food systems and a new adaptation centre in Egypt.

However, overall, the US is falling behind other development partners in terms of climate finance to Africa. As figure 4 below demonstrates, the US and Canada combined provided less than $1 billion in public climate finance to African countries during 2019/2020, ranking lower than other development partners such as France, Germany, and the UK.



Figure 4: International public climate finance in Africa 2019/2020 by bilateral development partners.

The US has also been accused of hypocrisy by advocating for energy transitions away from fossil-fuel dependence across the continent, and by being somewhat reluctant to agree to "loss and damage" funds and mechanisms. For instance, while US climate envoy John Kerry admitted to the importance of gas as a transitional energy source, he discouraged African governments from investing in long-term gas projects during the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment in September. In contrast, analysts note that, for instance, on the first day of the year, the average American had already emitted more CO2 than the average person living in Democratic Republic of Congo, and by Monday, surpassed annual emissions of Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Cameroon.

Furthermore, US loans and investment towards fossil fuel projects remains higher than levels of public bilateral climate finance towards African countries. As shown in Figure 5 below, US funding for fossil fuel projects has increased after the Paris agreement was signed in 2015, amounting to more than $9 billion dollars. This figure accounts for two thirds of the total money the US has given to oil and gas projects across the globe since 2015.



Figure 5: US Funding in Fossil Fuel Projects in Africa 2012-2021.

2.7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

At and beyond the US-Africa Summit, four recommendations could accelerate the growth of U.S. and Africa climate action cooperation.

- **Commit to shift US FDI away from fossil-fuels and subsidize investment opportunities in single and multi-country green energy and climate-related projects** such as manufacturing of environmental goods (e.g. batteries), industrial use of hydrogen, and projects included under the AU's Agenda 2063 Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).
- **Share lessons and experiences on South Africa's** just Energy Transition Partnership (JET-P) with both African and G7 stakeholders to determine best practice going forward. This information sharing and collaboration will enable African policymakers to adapt and tailor climate policies under JET-P accordingly.
- **Align objectives and commitments with the AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan** which is a comprehensive plan covering 2022-2032 and details a wide range of strategic intervention covering all aspects of the continent's development.
- **Scale up climate finance** and engage proactively in loss and damage solutions.