The annual diplomat’s festival, otherwise known as the UN General Assembly, has just closed off. Fresh off the heels of intense negotiations around the United Nation’s Summit of the Future, a key question for world leaders was the reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC), arguably the United Nation’s most powerful forum. For African countries, recent developments presented a fork in the road situation: Should they continue to pursue step-by-step reform of the UNSC, or challenge its entire premise?
The Need for UNSC Reform
The UNSC was put together by the major powers following World War II in 1945, a period when most African nations were still under colonial rule with no representation in international affairs. Today, Africa is highly overrepresented in the problems the UNSC addresses: as recently as 2018, over 50 percent of council meetings and 70 percent of its resolutions concerned Africa’s peace and security, but the makeup of the UNSC remains as it was in 1945. The UNSC maintains a structure of 5 “permanent” members who also have a veto each, plus 10 rotating members who are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly and have no veto. Of the total 15, there are always 3 African seats; however, they are always within the “rotating” group and have no veto.
Unsurprisingly, given the shifts in the independence of African nations since 1945, as well as the substantive focus of the UNSC, the calls for stronger African representation have only strengthened over time.
Africa’s Twenty-Year-Old Position on UNSC Reform
Initially, two decades ago, in 2005, a group of African leaders called the African Union Committee of Ten (C-10) was established with a mandate to push for a common African position as per reform of the UNSC. In the same year, the African Union (AU) adopted two documents to serve as the framework for its common position on UN reforms; the first was the Ezulwini Consensus, adopted during the 22nd Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council of the AU in March, and the second was the Sirte Declaration, which was adopted in June. The consensus contained reform points for the United Nations, such as boosting its capacity to address development challenges and governance, increasing African participation by expanding the UN secretariat, and, most importantly, calling for Africa “to be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the UN, particularly in the Security Council,” where the continent should have no less than two permanent seats, “with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including the right of veto.”
More recently, in 2023, during the UN General Assembly’s annual debate, the then-president of the UN General Assembly, Dennis Francis, admitted that without structural reform, the effectiveness and legitimacy of the UNSC will only be further compromised. In the same year, during a summit of the C-10, the president of Equatorial Guinea, Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, pointed out that renewed effort had to be directed at confronting the historic injustices and marginalization that African nations have faced for decades.
In August 2024, during a UN debate on Africa’s participation in the UNSC, Sierra Leonean president Julius Maada Bio demanded that Africa have two permanent seats and two nonpermanent seats on the UNSC. He further stated that the veto should be abolished, and if UN member states wish to retain the veto, it must extend to all new permanent members of the UNSC “as a matter of justice.” Back in August, Namibia’s foreign policy chief, Peya Mushelenga, reiterated his country’s alignment with the Ezulwini Consensus and the 2005 Sirte Declaration while addressing the UNSC high-level debate on the maintenance of international peace and security. He further stated that the reforms are not just for Africa’s benefit, but are also intended to reflect recent geopolitical developments, with the aim of improving the United Nation’s ability to maintain international security while boosting development.
Africa’s Call for Reform Appears to Be Finding Global Support
The fact is, UNSC reform is an aspiration Africa shares with countries and coalitions around the world. One such grouping is the G4 (comprising Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan). The G4 has also presented a reform proposal for the UNSC that would expand its membership to 25 members, with 4 additional nonpermanent members and 6 additional permanent members. India introduced the reform model on behalf of the G4 at the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform back in March 2024. The permanent members of the UNSC also seem to be shifting their positions.
In July 2024, the United Kingdom used its rotating presidency of the UNSC to call for the expansion of the UNSC’s permanent seats to include Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, as well as African representation. And earlier this September, the United States declared that it will support the addition of two African countries as permanent members of the UNSC, the caveat, however, being that these countries will have no veto power. The report also states that the United States has expressed support for the representation of Germany, India, Japan, and South America—but not Brazil—in the UNSC. Last month, France also reaffirmed its support for reforming the UNSC: “France’s position is clear, long-held and unwavering: it is abnormal that Africa, which accounts for more than a quarter of UN member states, is not represented among the permanent members of the Security Council. This must, and can, change now.” However, like the United States, Paris also does not support the extension of veto use in the UNSC.
China too has said it supports the push for reform but cautions that any new reforms must prioritize the effectiveness of decisionmaking while reflecting the changing dynamics of international geopolitics. Hence, the recent summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing stated China’s support for permanent African representation at the UNSC but did not give clear support for the Ezulwini Consensus or the 2005 Sirte Declaration. Similarly, Russia is supportive of calls for reforms, but only under unique conditions, as it is also concerned about the ineffectiveness of the organization in dealing with conflict resolution. That said, for the first time this year, the BRICS grouping, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, acknowledged the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration in the joint statement of the BRICS ministers of foreign affairs and international relations following their meeting in Russia.
Opposition to Reform
There is also opposition to reform, stemming from several quarters.
The first is a 12-member country grouping called United for Consensus (UfC) that has used various tactics to obstruct the reform process from moving forward because its members are against certain countries getting permanent seats. The UfC is led by Italy and includes Pakistan and Canada.
The second source of opposition to reform is concerned that new members—for instance, African countries—do not actually have the economic and political weight to be strong, permanent UNSC members, and therefore their seats, with or without veto power, would be a waste of space and time. The argument goes that creating more African seats is putting the cart before the horse. Let Africa riseconomically—first, and the need for its seats will be obvious. While this approach might seem very fair, especially within the capitalist-driven, ostensibly merit-based multilateral system, its detractors argue that it fails to account for historic injustices and overlooks the possibility that the absence of strong representation and decisionmaking is a key factor that (endogenously) drives Africa’s lack of economic development.
The third source of opposition to reform is even more fundamental: whether the UNSC, in its current form, should exist at all. In this view, the extension of “permanent” African membership—especially without veto power—could legitimize a highly dysfunctional system without providing meaningful benefits to the continent. It would essentially endorse, and perpetuate, the exclusivity of power and the differential access to it. Is greater influence within a multilateral system based on what appears to be zero-sum principles, at the expense of others, truly worthwhile? Is it more worthy for Africans—and the world at large—to focus instead on genuinely democratizing power in the global arena?
Hence, there have been calls for the complete abolition of veto power. There have also been alternative calls—including by the authors’ firm, Development Reimagined—for a reimagining of the UNSC that completely removes permanent membership while extending the terms of elected members and enabling all elected members to have veto powers.
What Happens Next?
These significant questions should undoubtedly be at the core of the debates that diplomats and leaders will have during the UN Summit of the Future and should drive the eventual negotiation text. The desire for UNSC reform among African policymakers has primarily been guided by the aim of addressing the historic injustices that Africa has faced on the global stage, the urgency to restore the legitimacy of the United Nations and multilateralism, in general, and the necessity for African leaders to have more say in protecting their own security interests amid the escalating global security competition between the major powers. But whether permanent membership without a veto—which appears to be the compromise position most, if not all, existing permanent members are willing to endorse—will meet those three aims remains highly contested. Should Africa compromise, maintain resolve for the full deal, or reimagine the UNSC? The choice is not an easy one.
